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Integrating Technology and Human 

Resources for High-Performance 

Manufacturing: Evidence froin 

\ 
the International Auto Industry 
JOHN PAUL MacDUFFIE AND JOHN F. KRAFClK 
For much of the last decade, technology has held the spotlight as a powerful force that 
has both promoted dramatic economic restructuring and offered individual finns new 
strategic opportunities for responding to changing competitive conditions. I But the 
enthusiastic predictions of the early 19805 about the cost-saving and quality-enhancing 
capabilities of advanced microprocessor-based technologies were matched late in the 
decade by a chorus of concern about the failure of many technology investments to 
yield expected perfonnance results (Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow, 1989; Loveman. 
1988; Roach, 1987). 
These unrealized expectations have brought increasing attention to the organiza­
tional context into which new technologies are introduced. According to this perspec­
tive, new technological capabilities contribute effectively to improved economic per­
formance only when the organizational skills and flexibility needed for rapid 
absorption and mastery of these capabilities are present and evolving simultaneously 
(Adler; 1988; Kochan, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and MacDuffie, 1990; Walton, 1990). 
This chapter cames this line of Ju.gument one step further, by summarizing the 
results of our study in the manufacturing sector of seventy automotive assel,llbly plants 
representing twenty-four companies and seventeen countries worldwide. The detailed 
data and statistical analyses that produced these results are presented in several earlier 
papers (Krafcik, 1989; Krafcik and MacDuffie, 1989; MacDuffie, 1989). Our summary 
here emphasizes the implications of our findings for the study and practice of organiza­
tional change. 
Out of our work (and that of our colleagues in the International Motor Vehicle 
Program) has emerged the concept of a "lean production system." that is, a production 
system embedded in an organizational context that takes as a premise the existence of a 
skilled. motivated. and flexible work force, following a logic quite distinct from 
traditional mass production (Kenney and Rorida. 1988; Piore, 1989; Womack, Jones, 
and Roos, 1990). We find that plants with lean production systems have dramatically 
better productivity (fewer hours per car) and quality (fewer defects per car) than mass 
production plants. 
We also find that technology is utilized differently in lean and mass production 
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systems. Under the "organizational logic" oflean production, human resource strategy 
is integrated with technology strategy (Shimada and MacDuffie, 1987). Policies that 
develop work force skill. motivation. and flexibility and that promote ongoing prob­
lem-solving (or "continuous improvement") activity are seen as critical to the effective 
use of technology. This contrasts with traditional mass production. in which tech­
nological advances are expected to enhance managerial control. reduce labor costs, and 
minimize reliance on work force capabilities. 
Accordingly. we contend that new technological capabilities will contribute more 
effectively to economic performance in the context of a lean production system than in 
a traditional mass production context. The chapter describes the "organizational logic" 
of lean production. explains how technology is utilized in this context. and reviews the 
analyses supporting this "integration" argument. 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL LOGIC 
OF LEAN PRODUCTION 
The model of lean production upon which the assembly plant study is based is drawn 
from Shimada and MacDuffie's analysis (1987) of the production system in Japanese­
owned assembly plants located in the United States, the so-called transplants. The 
transplants offer a valuable opportunity to consider the structure of the Japanese ap­
proach to organizing the production system apart from the cultural context from which 
it emerged. Shimada and Mac Duffie find that the key organizational innovations of 
"lean production," as developed in Japan, have been transferred nearly completely to 
the U.S. context, and they conclude that this approach is potentially applicable in any 
cultural setting. 
The key organizational innovations of lean production are those linking the use of 
buffers and the development and deployment of human resources. We consider these in 
turn, contrasting the "organizational logic" of lean production and mass production. 
Use of Buffers 
Mass production uses highly specialized resources (both equipment and people) ap­
plied to the high-volume production of standardized products to achieve economies of 
scale. To ensure that these economies can be achieved, the production process must be 
protected as much as possible from disruptions (such as sales fluctuations. supply 
interruptions, equipment breakdowns) by large buffers-of inventory, repair space, 
extra equipment, and utility workers. These buffers moderate the tight coupling among 
steps in the production process, creating some slack, which minimizes the impact of 
contingencies. 
In lean production, these buffers are seen as costly, for several reasons. The buffers 
themselves represent a commitment to resources not directly devoted to production. 
Inventories must be purchased, stored, and handled. A repair area, which provides a 
postprocess remedy for problems that would otherwise disrupt the primary production 
process, must be staffed. Inventory buffers also hinder the move from one product 
design to another, requiring elaborate planning to ensure that parts from the old design 

211 INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
are used up and replaced by parts from the new design at the same rate that sales of the 
former product are declining and sales of the new product are increasing. 
More important, buffers can also hide production problems or reduce the pressure 
to deal with them. A key innovation of lean production, pioneered by Taiichi Ono at 
Toyota, was to see disruptions to the production process as opportunities for learning 
(Ono, 1988). In this view, organizational slack, in the form of buffers, allows produc­
tion problems to be ignored or deferred. The minimization of buffers, as exemplified 
by just-in-time inventory policies, therefore serves a cybernetic or feedback function, 
providing valuable information that can be used for continuous incremental improve­
ment of the production system (Cusamano, 1985; Monden, 1983; Schonberger, 1982). 
The term "lean production" is a metaphor for this philosophy about the use of buffers. 
Development and Deployment of Human Resources 
This approach to buffers is inextricably linked to policies that govern human resources. 
For if the minimization of buffers creates the incentive to identify problems and engage 
in incremental problem-solving activity, it is the development and deployment of 
human resources that create the capability to do so effectively. 
Workers must be able to identify quality problems as they appear on the line, since 
there is almost no stock of surplus parts and very little space to put vehicles needing 
repair. To be able to solve the problems they find (either alone or in a problem-solving 
group), they must have both a conceptual grasp of the production process and the 
analytical skills to identify the root cause of problems. This in tum requires a de­
centralization of production responsibilities from specialized inspectors to production 
workers and a variety of multiskilling practices, including extensive off- and on-the-job 
training, work teams, and job rotation within a few broad job classifications. 
Furthermore, these skills and abilities are of little use unless workers are motivated 
to contribute mental as well as physical effort. The attentiveness, analytical perspec­
tive, and creativity needed for incremental problem solving cannot be attained through 
close supervision or the elaborate control systems used to ensure compliance in a mass 
production system. 
Workers will bring those qualities to their jobs only if they believe there is a real 
alignment between their individual interests and those of the company, and they will 
commit themselves to advancing company goals only if they believe there is a re­
ciprocal commitment from the company to invest in their future well-being. As a 
result, lean production is characterized by such "high-commitment" human resource 
policies as employment security; compensation that is partially contingent on corpo­
rate, plant, and/or individual perfonnance; and a reduction of status barriers between 
managers and workers. The company investment in building worker skills also contrib­
utes to this "psychological contract" of reciprocal commitment. 
To summarize, in a lean production system the stimulus to achieving cost and 
quality improvements is the reduction of buffers, which has both a direct effect (e.g., 
reducing the carrying cost of inventories) and a more significant indirect effect­
providing valuable information about production problems and an ongoing incentive to 
utilize that information in incremental problem-solving activity. While the reduction of 
buffers can promote this problem-solving approach, it will be effective only when 
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human resource policies are in place that generate the necessary skills in the work force 
and create a sense of reciprocal commitment between company and worker. 
A IiFragile" System 
Shimada and MacDuffie (1987) call attention to an important aspect of lean. produc4 
tion's interdependence between the use of buffers and human resource policies. They 
characterize Jean production as a "fragile" system. This is true for both components of 
lean production. When buffers are minimized, any minor disruption, such as the failure 
of a supply delivery to arrive on time, can force the entire plant to shut down. 
ParadoxicalJy, the awareness of this vulnerability can strengthen the production system 
by providing an ongoing incentive to maintain effective communication and problem4 
solving skilJs, both within the plant and in relationships with suppliers (Nishiguchi, 
1989). 
Lean production is also fragile with respect to its dependence on human resources. 
As lean production diffuses beyond its source in Japan, it is highly vulnerable to the 
mass production assumptions and mindsets that have dominated managerial and en4 
gineering practice in this century. Unless managers keep the skill levels of the work 
force high, unless they create a culture of reciprocal commitment in which workers will 
be willing to contribute to process improvement, unless they accept the premise that 
technology must be used in a way that complements rather than minimizes the role of 
human resources. lean production will quickly deteriorate and revert to mass produc­
tion. 
Thus in practice lean production is not weaker or more prone to breakdown than 
mass production. Indeed. the characteristics of lean production just described often 
yield a greater resilience and organizational flexibility in the face of changing condi4 
tions than do those of mass production. Yet this paradox remains-that maintaining a 
constant awareness of lean production's "fragility" is in many ways critical to preserv4 
ing this resilience and flexibility. 
TECHNOLOGY IN A LEAN PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
The organizational context of lean or mass production systems affects the utilization of 
hardware technology in several ways. One is the degree to which each production 
system uses resources-whether hardware or people-in a specialized way. Another. 
closely related to the fIrst, is the degree to which production processes and tasks remain 
standardized and fIxed over time. A third is the role of the work force with respect to 
modifying both equipment and task specifications. 
A core premise of mass production is that the efficiency of production increases as 
the division of labor becomes more extensive and the specialization of both machines 
and jobs increases. This specialization is limited by the market for whatever is being 
produced. A sufficient volume of a product must be made to keep specialized resources 
fully utilized, or the inefficiencies of underutilized resources will outweigh the efficien­
cies of specialization. 
Standardized product designs allow for the most extensive specialization of ma4 
chines and jobs. The greatest efficiencies then result from producing a very large 
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volume of such a product in very large batches, both because of economies of scale and 
to minimize setup costs, which are high when hardware is so thoroughly specialized 
around the requirements of a standard design. 
The imperatives for technology under mass production, therefore, are that it be 
dedicated to a specific product, very efficient in its execution of a highly specialized 
task, and capable of operating for extremely long production runs. Once a new tech­
nology is installed, it should be modified as little as possible jf it is to meet these 
conditions successfully. While this ideal of minimal modification is rarely achieved, it 
remains the primary orientation and goal of a mass production organization. 
Under lean production, there is less concern with the efficiencies of specialization 
and more concern with the costs of rigidity in the use of technology. General purpose 
multifunctional or programmable equipment is favored for its ability to switch among 
product designs at a lower cost in time and money than specialized equipment. Produc­
tion runs are short, both to provide more opportunities to switch among products and, 
more important, to speed the feedback that can be provided to upstream processes for 
problem resolution. 
Most significantly for this discussion, the incremental problem-solving orientation 
in lean production is also applied to hardware technology. Each type of production 
equipment has its own idiosyncrasies that keep it from being used at full capacity; the 
more complex the equipment, the greater the idiosyncrasies. In both mass and lean 
production settings, operators, maintenance personnel, and engineers all learn over 
time how to minimize the impact of these idiosyncrasies. 
Under mass production, the acquisition and application of this "working knowl­
edge" about equipment glitches is constrained by the broader imperatives of specializa­
tion, standardization, and high-volume production (Hirschhorn, 1984; Kusterer, 1984). 
But under lean production, workers and engineers apply their problem-solving abilities 
to the task of improving equipment performance over time. This process of incremental 
improvements is c<?mmonly referred to in Japanese plants as "giving wisdom to the 
machine." It means that production technology need not be automatically subject to 
decay and depreciation but can actually appreciate in value over time. 
For example, under mass production, the installation and "debugging" of a new 
technology are handled by staff specialists or vendors, whereas these responsibilities 
are often given to workers under lean production. This means that the important 
learning from this initial period is retained among those who will operate (and seek 
further improvement in) the equipment over time rather than being taken along to the 
next plant or customer. 
Another crucial aspect of giving wisdom to the machine is the continual modifica­
tion of job specifications by the work force. In some cases, these are jobs that relate 
directly to the use of technology, such as equipment setup times. Minimizing setup 
time is crucial to achieving small-lot production and the rapid feedback it provides. 
Therefore, workers and engineers work to improve the layout, fixtures, and procedures 
involved in, for example, changing a stamping press die. This type of die change once 
commonly took several hours (and still does in some mass production plants). But most 
Japanese plants and an increasing number of U.S. plants have managed to reduce this 
die change time to under ten minutes, often without any major capital investment. 
The same principle of continual process improvement applies to all job specifica­
tions under lean production, whether directly related to technology or not. Here, too, 
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mass production seeks to specialize and standardize as much as possible, for greater 
efficiency. The specification process is assigned to industrial engineers, who follow the 
rationalization prescriptions of Frederick Taylor to assign an appropriate work time to 
each process step. Workers can ease the demands of their job if they successfully fool 
the industrial engineer into setting a task cycle time that is greater than what they 
actually need to do the job. 
Under lean production, workers have a major role in determining specific work 
procedures and methods. While production levels and the basic framework for the 
production process are determined by engineering requirements, teams of production 
workers have responsibility for developing, recording, and modifying job specifica­
tions. These specifications are extremely detailed, as much as any industrial engineer­
ing time study, but with the crucial difference that workers, rather than managers or 
engineers, take charge of their revision (Cole, 1990; Krafcik, 1988b; Monden, 1983). 
We previously noted a tendency for mass production plants to rely on more spe­
cialized equipment and for lean production to use more general purpose equipment. It 
is perhaps more significant that the differences in the approach to technology in these 
two systems often persist regardless of the tyPe of hardware being used. In other 
words, under mass production, general purpose equipment tends to be used as if it was 
specialized equipment intended for long, unvarying production runs. Conversely, un­
der lean production, specialized or dedicated equipment tends to be subject to the same 
processes of incremental modification as general purpose equipment. 
Thus there are two reasons to believe that technological capabilities will be utilized 
more effectively under lean production than mass production. First, the organizational 
context of mass production, with its prerogatives of high volume, specialization, and 
standardization, leads to a relatively static or rigid use of technology (Abernathy, 
1978). This can be true even when the technology is inherently flexible, as with 
robotics and other microprocessor-based programmable equipment (Jaikumar, 1986). 
Second, the problem-solving orientation and skills of the work force under lean pro- . 
duction facilitate the process of introducing any new technology and also yield valu­
able modifications over time. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The foregoing discussion lays out the difference in organizational logic between lean 
production and mass production and develops the hypothesis that the link between the 
minimization of buffers and the extensive development of human resource capabilities 
under Jean production contributes significantly to such manufacturing outcomes as 
high productivity and high quality. It also advances the "integration" hypothesis that 
advanced technologies will contribute more effectively to manufacturing performance 
under lean production than under mass production. We next review the empirical 
evidence on these two hypotheses. 
THE INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE 
ASSEMBLY PLANT STUDY 
The International Automotive Assembly Plant Study was initiated in 1986. By May 
1990, we had visited ninety assembly plants, representing twenty-four assemblers in 
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sixteen countries, and seventy of those plants had responded to our survey. Almost all 
of the auto-producing regions of the world and all the major assemblers, with the 
exception of those in the Soviet bloc and China, participated in our study. 
Although this chapter reports primarily on the relationship of technology and 
production organization to manufacturing performance, the assembly plant study was 
designed to address the role of other explanatory variables as well, such as model mix 
complexity, parts complexity, scale, and product design age. A summary of the com­
plete multivariate analysis of these factors can be found in Krafcik and Mac Duffie 
(1989) and MacDuffie (1991). Some of these control variables are significant, but none 
of them change the basic results described here. Of these, product design age was most 
influential. We believe that this variable is ~ proxy for "design for manufacturability," 
that is, newer products are more likely to have been designed with ease of manufacture 
in mind. This supports our belief that design for manufacturability has an important 
effect on assembly plant productivity and quality. Indeed, this is an issue we intend to 
study intensively in our future work. 2 
Our sample consists of sixty-two plants, all in the volume (as opposed to lux­
ury/specialty) product category. The regional distribution of these plants (and, for U.S. 
plants, the region of the parent company) is presented in Table 13.1. 
METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONAUZATION3 
Productivity 
We define productivity as the hours of actual working effort required to complete a 
group of designated assembly plant "standard activities" on a product standardized by 
size, option content, and product manufacturability in the welding and painting areas. 
These adjustments do take into account differing levels of vertical integration, worker 
relief periods, and absenteeism. No adjustments are made for differing levels of auto­
mation, plant scale, or assembly area manufacturabiIity. The bulk of the plants in this 
survey assemble products ranging in size' from Ford Escort to Ford Taurus. 
Quality 
We used the U.S. market 19891. D. Power Initial Quality Survey to develop an index 
which reflects only those defects that an assembly plant can affect, ignoring such areas 
as engine perfonnance and reliability. The emphasis therefore is on fit and finish of 
Table 13.1 Composition of volume assembly plant data 
Regional Category n 
Japan (J/J) 8 
Japanese-parent plants in North America (J/NA) 4 
U.S.-parent plants in North America (US INA) 14 
Europe (AllIE) 19 
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body panels and trim pieces, paint quality, and integrity of electrical connections. In 
those cases where plants in the survey do not sell products in the United States, we used 
internal company quality data correlated to J. D. Power figures to increase the size of 
the quality data base. 
Production Organization Index 
This index is the average of two component measures of production organization: Use 
of Buffers and Human Resource Management (HRM) Policies. When combined into 
the Production Organization Index. a high score indicates a lean production system and 
a low score indicates a mass production system. 
The Use ofBuffers Index measures a set of production practices that are indicative 
of overall production philosophy. It includes the percentage of assembly floor space 
allocated to final repair, the capacity of the in-process buffer between the paint and 
assembly areas, and a measure of inventory policy that reflects the level of inventory 
stocks and the frequency of parts delivery to the line. A high score for this variable 
indicates a minimal use of buffers and a low score indicates an extensive use of buffers. 
The HRM Policies Index captures a wide variety of work structures and personnel 
practices that affect the development and deployment of human resources. Six vari­
ables reflect shop floor work organization: how direct assembly tasks are organized 
(the extent to which work teams and job rotation are used); how indirect tasks tradi­
tionally handled by functional specialists are allocated (the extent to which quality 
inspection and statistical process control are assigned to production workers); and the 
level of worker participation in problem-solving activity (the percentage of the work 
force involved in employee involvement groups and the number of production-related 
suggestions received and implemented). 
Four other variables measure policies that affect the "psychological contract" 
between employees and the organization: the recruiting methods and hiring criteria· 
used in selecting the work force. the extent to which the compensation system is 
contingent upon performance, the extent to which status barriers between managers 
and workers are present or absent, and the level of ongoing training offered to experi­
enced production workers. supervisors, and engineers. A high score for this variable 
indicates a high-commitment, multiskilling bundle of HRM policies; and a low score 
indicates low-commitment, specializing policies. 
Technology Measures 
We use two complementary technology measures, the Robotic Index and Total Auto­
mation. The Robotic Index is the number of robots in the welding, painting, and 
assembly areas adjusted for the scale of the plant. Since robots are often a new 
investment and are by definition flexible, the Robotic Index captures these aspects of a 
plant's technological intent or strategy. It does, however, miss the often substantial 
investments plants make in fixed automation. 
Our other technology variable, the Total Automtltion Index. captures the level of 
both flexible and fixed automation. Total Automation measures the percentage of direct 
production steps in the welding, painting, and assembly areas that are automated. As 
such, it is essentially an indicator of the total automation stock in the plant. Unlike the 
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Robotic Index, it does not indicate the characteristics of the automation, Le., old or 
new, flexible or fixed. Also, since it measures the percentage of total direct production 
steps that are automated, we can expect it to be somewhat correlated with our produc­
tivity measure, which reflects the labor hours required for nonautomated direct produc­
tion steps (along with all indirect and salaried/administrative labor hours). However, 
this allows for a conservative test of our hypothesis that a high technology level will not 
produce high performance in a plant lackin~ a lean production system. 
THE SIMULTANEOUS ACHIEVEMENT OF HIGH 
QUAUTY AND HIGH PRODUCTIVITY 
Although traditional manufacturing doctrine propounds that high levels of quality and 
high levels of productivity are incompatible, our study results show otherwise. We 
divide the sample into four performance zones (Figure 13.1) and find a surprising 
number of plants that achieve better than average productivity and quality perfor­
mance, with an overall correlation between these outcomes of .36 (p = .007). Further, 
we have identified a small group of "world-class" plants that simultaneously achieve 
very high levels of productivity and quality.4 
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Note that the simultaneous achievement of better than average quality and produc­
tivity is not limited to plants in Japan; six American, one European, and three New 
Entrant plants join five Japanese-parent plants in this zone. On the other hand, the 
world-class performance zone contains only Japanese plants-four in Japan and two in 
North America. One striking manifestation of the relationship between these outcomes 
is the small number of plants with above-average quality and below-average productiv­
ity, or below-average quality and above-average productivity. For the majority of the 
plants in our sample, quality levels and productivity levels are closely linked. 
PRODUCTION ORGANIZATION, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND MANUFACTURING PERFORMANCE 
As indicated previously, we derive the Production Organization (ProdOrg) Index as the 
average of two component measures, Use of Buffers and Human Resource Manage­
ment (HRM) Policies. We argued that these two measures were conceptually interre­
lated. As Figure 13.2 shows, they are highly interrelated statistically as well. 
The ProdOrg Index is strongly correlated with performance results for this sample 
of plants, with a simple correlation of r = -.59 (n = 57, p = .(00) with productivity 
(hours per vehicle) and a simple correlation of r = -.63 (n = 45, p = .(00) with 
quality (defects per 100 vehicles). This indicates that about 36 percent of the variation 
in both productivity and quality for this sample of plants can be explained by this 
organizational measure alone. 
As a test of the separate effects of the two production organization components on 
performance, we examined the correlation between the ProdOrg Index and our key 
outcome variables, controlling successively for each of the components (Table 13.2). 
The greater the drop in the correlation between ProdOrg and productivity when 
controlling for one component, the greater the role of that component in accounting for 
the overall relationship. Thus, Use of Buffers and HRM Policies contribute almost 
. equally to the strong relationship between ProdOrg and productivity. With quality as 
the outcome measure, however, the HRM Policies measure is the most influential 
component, with the Use of Buffers measure contributing much less to the overall 
relationship. Although we would have expected Use of Buffers to contribute as much to 
quality as to productivity results, these findings are broadly supportive of the earlier 
arguments about why a lean production system is able to achieve high productivity and 
quality outcomes. It does suggest that it may be possible to minimize buffers for purely 
Use of Buffers 
ti r= .65 
Figure 13.2 Correlation ofHRM Policies production organization 
components. 
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Table 13.2 Correlations between production organization and key outcomes 
Correlation of Production Organization with: 
Productivity (hours/vehicle) Quality (defects/IOO vehicles) 
No controls -.59 -.63 
Controlling for Use of Buffers -.25 -.37 
Controlling for HRM Policies -.24 -.23 
cost reduction purposes, thus improving productivity, without changing the organiza­
tional processes that lead to high quality. The use of buffers must therefore be matched 
with HRM policies that improve a plant's capability for ongoing problem solving, as 
argued earlier. 
The two technology measures also have statistically significant correlations with 
both outcomes. The simple correlation of Total Automation with productivity is r = 
- .67 (n = 62, P = .(00) and with quality is r = -.41 (n = 46, P = .(02). For the 
Robotic Index, the simple correlation with productivity is r = - .55 (n = 62, p = .(00) 
and with quality is r = -.41 (n = 46, P = .(02). Despite the differences in these 
measures, they result in similar characterizations of the technology levels of a given 
plant, as shown by the high simple correlation between them of r = .81 (n = 62, 
P = .(00). 
TESTING THE INTEGRATION HYPOTHESIS FOR 
PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY 
Having considered the separate relationships of production organization and tech­
nology to performance, we now analyze their combined effect to assess the integration 
hypothesis.s We first examine the relationship between technology and both outcomes 
for subgroups of mass production and lean production plants, formed by using the 
sample average for the ProdOrg Index (44.6). Table 13.3 shows that the correlation 
between Total Automation and both productivity and quality is much stronger for the 
lean than for the mass production subgroup. 
We then further subdivide our sample by using the sample average score for Total 
Automation (24.4 percent), generating four quadrants that reflect all possible combina­
tions of technology and organizational context. In Figure 13.3, we show the average 
productivity and quality outcomes for each quadrant. 





(hours/vehicle) (defects/IOO vehicles) 
LeanProd plants (n = 21) 
Total Automation -.79 (p = .(00) -.39 (p = .053) 
MassProd plants (n = 36) 
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Figure 13.3 Level of automation versus production organization. 
As Figure 13.3 shows, Low-Tech-MassProd plants take, on average, 41 hours to 
build a vehicle with a poor quality level-over 100 defects per 100 vehicles-whereas 
plants in the High-Tech-LeanProd quadrant have the best perfonnance, taking only 22 
hours-just over half as many hours-to build a vehicle with superior quality perfor­
mance, with an average of about 50 defects per 100 vehicles. Plants in the High-Tech­
MassProd group perfonn at the intennediate level of 30 hours per vehicle and 80 
defects per 100 vehicles; the very few plants in the Low-Tech-LeanProd group have 
similarly intennediate results. 
We now examine the integration hypothesis for overall manufacturing perfor­
mance-the simultaneous achievement of high productivity and qUality. Table 13.4 
shows the average values of key explanatory variables, using the four perfonnance 
zones found in Figure 13. 1. 
Total Automation is very low (15 percent) for the low-productivity-Iow-quality 
group, jumps up to 30 percent for the high-prod-Iow-qual and high-prod-high-qual 
groups, and increases modestly to 36 percent for the world-class group. The amount of 
technology does not, therefore, significantly differentiate among the top three perfor­
mance groups. The Production Organization Index and its two component measures, in 
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Table 13.4 Averages for key variables by overall performance zone 
Production 
Total Automation Organization Use of Buffers HRM Policies 
Zone n (% auto steps) (100 = Lean) • (100 = Minimal) (100 = HiComm) 
Low-prod-Iow-qual 19 15.6 32.2 43.3 26.2 
High-prod-Iow-qual 6 31.6 35.1 44.4 30.4 
High-prod-high-qual IS 2!U 53.8 60.7 SO.4 
World class prod and qual 6 36.4 81.7 87.0 79.1 
contrast, do differ significantly across the top three groups, with the best perfonning 
group having the most lean production system, the most minimal buffers, and the most 
high-commitrnent HRM policies. These findings confinn that the best overall man· 
ufactQring perfonnance results when relatively high levels of automation are combined 
with a lean production system. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Support for the Integration Hypothesis 
We find that both production organization and technology are imp<'rtant factors in 
explaining manufacturing perfonnance when considered separately but contribute most 
significantly to high productivity and high quality when they occur together. This 
provides broad support for the "integration" hypothesis, which posits that a lean 
production system is a necessary condition for effectively utilizing high levels of 
automation. 
To summarize our findings, the correlation between technology and perfonnance is 
much stronger for LeanProd plants than for MassProd plants. High·Tech-LeanProd 
plants dramatically outperfonn Low·Tech-MassProd plants, with the latter group re· 
quiring 86 percent more hours per vehicle and yielding 112 percent more defects per 
100 vehicles. But High·Tech-LeanProd plants also substantially outperfonn traditional 
plants with comparably high levels of technology-the High·Tech-MassProd plants 
require 36 percent more hours per vehicle and yield 61 percent more defects per 100 
vehicles than this top·perfonning group. Furthennore, the technology measures are 
correlated much less with quality than with productivity, in contrast with the Produc· 
tion Organization measure, which is equally strongly correlated with both outcomes. 
Finally, when considering overall perfonnance (productivity and quality together), 
we find that technology has an important role in boosting perfonnance as plants move 
from very low levels of automation to moderate levels, even in the context of a mass 
production system. But the perfonnance gain in moving from moderate to high levels 
of automation appears to occur only when combined with the organizational, human 
resources, and manufacturing practices of a lean production system. 
Implications for Organizational Change 
While our analysis is cross-sectional, our observations of the industry suggest that the 
assemblers with the best manufacturing perfonnance have approached the integration 
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of technology and production organization by establishing a lean production system 
first. to provide a solid foundation. and then have moved to higher levels of automa­
tion. These assemblers have then been able to capitalize more quickly on new tech­
nological capabilities because their production systems facilitate learning and continu­
ous improvement. 
The value of these organizational capabilities extends to other aspects of lean 
production not addressed in this chapter. such as design for manufacturability. The high 
level of employee suggestions and of group problem-solving activity under lean pro­
duction is a valuable source of ideas for design improvements and is a crucial pan of 
the two-way flow of communication between design and manufacturing that is so 
critical to achieving easy-to-assemble products. Moreover, the multiskilling practices 
of lean production at the plant level, such as job rotation and high levels of ongoing 
training, are also applied at the corporate level, yielding design engineers and project 
managers who bring extensive manufacturing experience to their task. 
As noted earlier, our study finds that lean production, despite its source in Japan. is 
fully transferrable to other cultural and national settings. Both the Japanese transplants 
in North America and a growing number of U.S.-owned and New Entrant plants 
(though almost no European plants) have established that the principles of lean produc­
tion have universal value. 
Yet the switch from mass production to lean production is far from simple. Because 
the bundle of practices and policies that make up lean production are so closely 
interrelated, transitional states between mass and lean production, in which some 
aspects of both systems are in place, are treacherous. When some production crisis 
challenges a plant in transition. the overwhelming pull is to revert to tried and true 
mass production principles by, for example, restoring buffers, reinstituting quality 
inspection, or recentralizing control over job specifications. Yet everything we know 
about organizational change also suggests that an abrupt shift to lean production, in 
response to what employees may perceive as a short-lived management fad, is also· 
likely to be doomed to failure. 
The most important first step for plants contemplating a move to lean production is 
education-managers, supervisors, engineers, and workers alike must understand the 
crucial (and not always obvious) differences in philosophy from mass production, in 
such areas as quality control, the use of buffers. process standardization, task spe­
cialization, and the role of the work force. Also important is the idea that work 
structures such as teams and quality circles are valuable only to the degree that they 
bring about changes in daily activities-especially the degree to which they promote 
ongoing problem-solving efforts from employees. Finally. those leading this change 
effort must understand the risks involved: lean production is a "fragile" system whose 
strength is realized only through prolonged efforts to minimize its vulnerabilities. 
We have found that this education is best accomplished through access by managers 
and union officials to a learning example-a lean production plant-through either 
joint ventures and other forms of strategic alliance or just geographical proximity. The 
transplants have provided this example for U.S. companies, whereas European com­
panies have remained mostly insulated. But for production workers, direct training in 
such lean production "basics" as statistical process control, the job specification pro­
cess (and other tasks traditionally assigned to industrial engineers), and "hands-on" 
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mastery of new technologies (setup, programming, preventive maintenance) are even 
more effective. 
Once an understanding of the principles of lean production" is achieved and training 
is under way, the change process can best be implemented through incremental steps 
that make clear to all the linkages between the policy of buffer minimization and the 
increased decentralization of responsibilities to shop floor workers (and the associated 
need for continued skill development). We have known some plants that have steadily 
closed down portions of their repair areas by roping them off or painting the floor a 
different color, creating more "off-limits" space by the week. Still other plants have 
tried to simulate the conditions of a just-in-time inventory system, even before achiev­
ing such arrangements with their suppliers, by delivering frpm parts storage to the line 
on a small-lot, high-frequency basis. 
Production crises may challenge the transition to a "lean" use of buffers. but there 
are many other developments that can threaten the culture of "reciprocal commitment" 
so necessary to lean production. Demonstrating a commitment to employment security 
(if not an absolute "no-layoff" policy), although tough to do in the cyclical U.S. auto 
industry, is probably essential for lean production to take hold. We believe that the 
Japanese transplants have gained considerable loyalty from their U.S. workers each 
time they have not resorted to layoffs during a period of volume decline. Otherpitfalls 
include the retention of visible status barriers differentiating managers and workers; 
compensation policies that award management bonuses in years when worker bonuses 
are not given; abuses of management discretion over job assignments within broad job 
classifications; and reliance on formal grievance mechanisms rather than informal, 
c1ose-to-the-source dispute resolution. 
Finally, the common separation (and even opposition) of technology strategy and 
human resource strategy under mass production must give way to an "integrated" 
perspective. As our data show, it is only through such integration that the high produc­
tivity and quality necessary for competitive success can be achieved. Many observers 
have noted the potential of new technologies to either enhance or constrain individual 
and organizational capabilities. Lean production provides the context in which the 
former scenario can be realized. Recognition of this fact may be the first step for any 
company (or country) concerned with both economic achievement and human develop­
ment. 
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NOTES 
I. This chapter summarizes some of the key results from the broader research project on 
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auspices of the M.I.T. International Motor Vehicle Program. The project grew out of Krafcik's 
case study of the NUMMI plant. where he developed the initial methodology for measuring 
assembly plant productivity and quality and from Shimada and MacDuffie's comparative case 
studies of Japanese manufacturing techniques found in Japanese assembly plants in North Amer­
ica. After Krafcik's M.S. thesis tested several hypotheses about assembly plant performance for 
a small sample of plants, Krafcik and MacDuffie combined forces to expand the sample and to 
develop and test a more complete model of the technological, human, and organizational deter­
minants of manufacturing performance. 
2. See Womack et aI. (1990) for a discussion of product development processes under lean 
production and the link to assembly plant performance. 
3. For more details on the methodology for calculating productivity and quality, see Krafcik 
(1988a); for the production organization index, see Mac Duffie (1989); for the technology vari­
ables, see Krafcik (1989). 
4. The lines separating the high and low productivity and quality zones are drawn at the 
sample average values for the 46 plants for which we have both kinds of data-33 hours per 
vehicle and 78 defects per 100 vehicles. The plants in the low-productivity-low-quality zone 
whose quality level is slightly better than the sample average were both few in number and 
virtually indistinguishable on most variables from those with worse-than-average qUality. The 
.... world-class.. zone includes plants with productivity levels better than 25 hours/vehicle and 
quality levels better than 50 defectsllOO vehicles. 
5. From this point on, we present results that use the Total Automation measure of tech­
nology. This measure is more comprehensive and tends to show a stronger link between tech­
nology and performance outcomes than the Robotic Index, thus providing a more conservative 
test of the hypothesis that a "mass production" organizational context limits the performance 
contributions of technology. 
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COMMENTARY BY RANGANATH NAYAK 
I'd like to start by encouraging continuation of this research by delving deeper into the 
question of what makes a high-tech-Iean production system possible. This fascinating 
piece of analysis explains the principles of productivity and quality. yet I wonder what 
it is that makes a high-tech-Iean production system possible in some organizations and 
not possible in others. 
In the tradition of consulting, I decided to look at some analogies. I examined a 
world-class basketball team, a world-class dinner, and a world-class automobile. What 
makes them world class? One thing I found in aU three of these is that apart from the 
ingredients, which must be good, there is also a master chef. a talented coach, or a very 
good designer who provide some sort of conceptual integrity to the thing that is being 

